I was listening to an author, David L. Phillips, today talk about his book. The book name is "Losing Iraq" and you can buy it through Barnes and Noble. The guy worked for the Coalition Authority, and he came to conclude that the Bush Administration and the coalition, well, basically blew it. In the book he details the Arrogance, incompetance, stupidity, and blown opportunities of the occupation. And he was discussing these things on the air today (06/17/2005).
Actually he could have been one of about three or four who have been unanimous in their opinions; Wesley Clark in his book: "Winning Modern Wars makes much the same points. And of course, Richard Clark, has basically the same opinion Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, although his book was written pretty much before we invaded. "Rise of the Vulcans" -- similar story.
The author quoted an experience where a young and imperious Bush Administration official was talking to one of the Interum Government people, an elderly Arab who asked him "have you read all the books on the British Empire in Iraq." And the guy proudly replied "Yes I've read everyone." And the guy allegedly replies "Well you must have read them, because you seem determined to repeat every mistake." The US went in undermanned, "on the cheap" and then proceeded to "de-baathesize" and fire the entire Iraqi Army, virtually "guaranteeing a well organized and well funded insurgency."
But what was most interesting was listening to the "sort of" debate between him and the representative of the American Enterprise Institute, who claimed to agree with him 95% and then proceeded to show that he still suffers the exact same arrogance that the author was talking about. The guy claims that we need to stay for an extended period, beyond rebuilding the army and overseeing elections. In other words, what any third world person would recognize, imperialism.
Amazing things. And each time one of these people appears they are attacked and vilified as liars, traitors, villains. And yet we keep finding out that in each case there is corroborrating evidence. Lies about WMD; Lack of plan? Read the Downing Street Memos -- or any of these books. I guess the folks who are so ready to believe anything they hear do so because it is quite impossible to believe that such people would lie to them. After all this is America, these are good down home Republicans who attend Church, Church socials, and pray to God for Crimminy sake. How could they lie when the good book says that lying is wrong? No, their critics must be the liars. Yet they do lie and they lie in legion.
These Downing street memos don't really say much that people didn't already know. But they are further evidence that Bush decided on war with Iraq in advance of having a reason to finish off Iraq and without a clear plan on how to win it. Michael Kinsey quotes:
http://www.mtstandard.com/articles/2005/06/14/newsopinion_top/hjjejdifjbjjia.txt
‘‘military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ... There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.''
And then writes:
"C's focus on the dog that didn't bark — the lack of discussion about the aftermath of war — was smart and prescient. But even on its face, the memo is not proof that Bush had decided on war. It states that war is ‘‘now seen as inevitable'' by ‘‘Washington.''
So if people are looking for evidence of the kind of quality to justify court actions or impeachments, forget it. The "smoking gun" here is not going to kill any tyrants or convict anyone. What is killing us is the aftermath of invading a country with no or a poor plan for dealing with the aftermath. They can still maintain that no evidence was cooked -- though the implication is clearly in the memos:
"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."
Rachel Campbell probably has the funniest take on it:
"I kept waiting for the liberals over at CNN or The New York Times or, well, anywhere to pick up this story and run with it, but it either never happened or it happened so briefly that I missed it."
http://www.journaltimes.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=1280
Read for yourself:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
Text:
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)